





Crouching Standards, Hidden Morals: A 
Choreographed National Rebuttal of Cosmopolitan 
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This case describes a sequence of events which started from 
allegations by non-government organizations of violations in the 
production unit of a global  brand, and moved to (acrimonious) 
denials by the supplier and multinational  buyers, failed negotiations, 
court cases, and judgments that crossed national boundaries. In the 
end, these events drew politicians and diplomats unwillingly into its 
vortex. The study shows how corporate actors, working from within a 
particular national space, can mobilize financial and emotional 
resources to align regulatory apparatuses of the state in their 
defence. The case also shows how global actors can be left in a no 
man’s land if they remain unaware of alliances being forged within 
national boundaries under a convenient smokescreen created by the 
confusion of roles and responsibilities to which they themselves may 
have contributed. 
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A labourer employed at a textile exporter’s plant in India tore off a 
label from  one of the pieces he was working on. He was following the 
advice of the local labour activist to whom he had earlier 
complained that he and other labourers were being abused at the 
factory. The complaints included beatings, verbal abuse, and 
inhumane working conditions. Following the tactics used by labour 
rights activists in the past, Indian activists realized the importance of 
identifying the Western brand for which the products were being 
manufactured. It was then quickly discovered that the brand being 
supplied by the manufacturer was a Dutch company. Given that Indian 
activists were part of a global network of labour rights activists, the 
conflict effortlessly shifted to the Netherlands and transformed itself 
into a global campaign through this network of international rights 
activists. 
 Finding a resolution, however, took longer than expected and 
was different from what the activists had anticipated. The global 
campaign that started was cut short abruptly as the company 
received unexpected and concerted protection from a range of 
national actors. Entry of these actors in  the supplier’s defence 
confused activists who were used to formulating their arguments in 
global terms and dealing predominantly with multinationals which 
had learned to acquiesce to their demands (Spar and La Mure, 2003). 
The ethnography that follows describes the processes through 
which state power manifests and reorients itself in more powerful 
ways — a significant trend in the case of emerging nations run by 
resource-rich states (India, China, Brazil, Ecuador, etc.) which are 
increasingly able to assert their own agenda on multinational actors. 
Efforts by NGO organizations and multinationals, whose actions are 
regulated by cosmopolitan principles, particularly when their 
criticisms from global standpoints are perceived as threats to 
sovereignty, can easily find their arguments nullified by the concerted 
activation of antithetical repertoires based on rooted nationalism. 
 
Relevance of State 
There is a long-held misconception in business and society that the 
state has  vanished, or is vanishing, and that multinationals are set to 
take over its obligations in developing countries. The shrinking of the 
state, or its perceived inability to deliver basic services, is expected to 
‘shift some of the responsibility for protecting citizenship rights away 
from the government’ (Matten and Crane, 2005: 171). Concepts such 
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as corporate citizenship and political CSR, which conceptualize a 
political role of multinationals in this new moral terrain, are built on 
this premise of a weak state (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et 
al, 2009; Hsieh, 2009; Matten and Crane, 2005). 
 In this respect, it is quite surprising that business scholars 
cling to, and expand on, theories based on a premise which 
sociologists and political economists dealing with globalization have 
already dismissed as a myth. Rather, the evidence overwhelmingly 
points to a reoriented, but still powerful, state (Cerny, 2009; Hay, 
2005; Djelic and Quack, 2003; Hirst, 1997;  Dicken, 1994). As Stopford 
and Strange (1991: 233) have noted: 
 However great the global reach of their operations, the national 
 firm does, psychologically and sociologically, ‘belong’ to its home 
 base. In the last resort, its directors will always heed the wishes 
 and commands of the government which has issued their 
 passports and those of their  families. 
 Nothing much has changed, at least in this regard, in spite of 
globalization. Does it mean, then, that the nation-state has remained 
intact under globalization? 
 Scholars working at the interface of geography, economic 
sociology (in particular on the governance of cities), and law have 
observed a curious paradox in globalization which illuminates a 
nuanced view of the embedding  of the global in the national (Sassen, 
2000; Brenner, 2000; Harvey, 1989). Take, for example, the case of 
attempts by governments to attract mobile capital into their 
countries: this is often considered to be an instance of hapless 
national governments acquiescing to the needs of globally mobile 
capital. It is partially true that governments compete as they make 
flashy attempts to attract the mobile global flow of investments 
‘dominated overwhelmingly by entrepreneurial competition-oriented 
projects to enhance territorially specific competitive advantages’ 
(Brenner, 2000). On the other hand, the fixity of territorial control 
‘brings to the fore the reality that many of the resources necessary for 
global economic activities are not hypermobile and are, indeed, deeply 
embedded in place, notably places such as global cities and export 
processing zones’ (Sassen, 2000: 79). These include relatively fixed 
infrastructures such as harbours and airports essential for 
facilitating the smooth global flow of products, resources and people 
which are funded by tax-payers’ money. The same paradox applies to 
the rooted nature of organs of the state such as courts, legislatures, 
and security apparatuses necessary for securing human rights and 
the significant influences wielded by territory, citizenship status, and 
legal protections stipulated in national constitutions (Russell, 2005; 
Sassen, 2003). For example, embassies, police stations, courts, 
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environment protection agencies, and so on, wield considerable 
influence on the lives of all citizens (including wealthy businessmen, 
the poor, and the environment) and cannot be replaced by other 
institutions (Manning et al, 2011; Karnani, 2009). 
 Rather than being weakened, therefore, the state can be seen 
in many cases as reinvigorated, precisely because of its exclusive 
control over the means by which profits can be extracted from some 
locations and channelled towards globally distributed centres. This 
rootedness inevitably involves struggles for control among different 
interest groups and therefore transformations wrought by 
globalization ‘should be regarded as a spatially grounded social 
process in which a wide range of different actors with quite different 
objectives and agendas interact through a particular configuration of 
interlocking spatial practices (Harvey, 1989: 5, emphases added). 
Those who do control these channels, therefore, have the power to 
facilitate or restrict the flow of cosmopolitan ideas and values, like 
human rights, into their territory.
1 In inequitable contexts germane to 
developing countries, political manoeuvers to influence these 
institutions are vicious and unforgiving, since the needs of private 
capital and the state are usually not  conducive to the well-being of the 
poor (cf. Randeria, 2003). Ensuring the security and well-being of the 
weak and voiceless alongside the quest for economic growth and 
profits, therefore, requires an analysis of who is controlling these 
national institutions and for whose benefit decisions are being made. 
 Globalized and distributed production has  been studied  by  
three strands of scholarship – global production networks (GPN), 
global commodity chains (GCC), and global value chains (GVCs) – each of 
which has engaged more fully than business and society scholars with 
the politics of production. Of these three, proponents of the GPN and 
GCC frameworks show a comparatively higher recognition of the 
significance of territorial space, and hence the role of the state, in 
spite of the global spread of production networks (Levy, 2008; Coe et 
al, 2008; Bair, 2005; Dicken, 2003; Henderson et al, 2002). They have 
noted the need to ‘resolve the basic tension between globalizing 
pressures on the one hand and localizing pressures on the other’ 
(Dicken, 2003: 235). Similarly, Bair (2010) observes how geo-political 
dynamics mediates gender and transnational production networks.  
This early stress on a territorial or embedded notion of production 
systems has encouraged GPN analyses to ‘incorporate all kinds of 
network configuration’, and ‘encompass all relevant sets of actors and 
relationships’ rather than to focus predominantly on those actors that 
 
1
 For instance, unless national laws that regulate mining are transformed to 
meet global standards, the displacement of communities, and extent of 
damage to the environment, may be severely compromised. 
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add economic value to the products being manufactured (Coe et al. 
2008: 272). Due to this pre-existing attention to politics and territory, 
Levy (2008: 947), for instance, is able to recast GPNs as the site of 
power struggles among ‘multiple actors in contested issue arenas’. 
 Although acknowledged in varying degrees, the attention to 
national actors even within the GPN/GCC frameworks continues to be 
insufficient, ‘making the globalization process seems less messy, 
contentious, or violent that it really is’ (Glassman, 2011: 154). 
Glassman (ibid., p. 158) notes that, barring a few exceptions, even GPN 
analyses have not focused on the ‘choreography of negotiations 
between the states and firms’. Similarly, Selwyn (2012) has 
underlined the need for the GCC approach engage more with theories 
of labour and capitalism. The ethnography that follows underlines 
these concerns by charting the increasing relevance of the state and 
the unique strategies firms in emerging markets employ to organize 
state support in their favour and thwart global activism. 
 
Methodology 
The case that follows here connected various sites in the Netherlands 
and in India and can be described as ‘multilocal’ (Hannerz, 2003). I 
have used some features of the extended case method to present the 
case (Burawoy, 1998; Glaeser, 2005). An ontological corollary to the 
approach is the assumption of social life as processes created by a 
fixed set of people who are involved in a sequence of events for a 
substantial period of time (Mitchell, 1983). A context is constituted by 
an unsystematic and historically contingent ‘incredibly dense thicket 
of partially independent and partially interacting social processes’ 
(Glaeser, 2005: 16), all of which cannot be mapped and reasoned out. 
Further, we know that ‘culture is contested, temporal, and emergent’ 
and ‘representations and explanation by both insiders and 
outsiders – is implicated in this emergence’ (Clifford and Marcus, 
1986: 19). The description and accompanying analysis offered  here  
are  therefore intertwined (Katz, 2002), and they are expected to 
generate allegorical images with different readers identifying 
themselves with one among the many ‘registers’ inherent in the 
description (Clifford, 1986). 
 The research was initiated at a time when, increasingly, India 
was being recast as an ‘emergent superpower’, and most developed 
countries were scrambling for attention within the various sections of 
Indian society – politics, industry, the arts, and so on. The Netherlands 
was no different in this  respect; India was one of the target countries 
for trade expansion under the Dutch Trade Board, set up by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs in 2006. National and regional bodies 
(such as those representing big cities and lesser-known regions in 
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Europe) frequently organize delegations and make presentations to 
the Indian public and private sectors on the desirability of their city 
or region as a destination for Indian companies. I happened to be part 
of one such regional organization and was a member of three 
business delegations from the Netherlands to India (2005-2009). I 
also participated in regularly organized events (in the Netherlands 
and in India) for the purpose of enhancing trade between the two 
countries. This ethnographic location, together with the actors being 
studied, at the interstices where global and national spheres collide, 
provided me with an unusual position and view of some of the events 
that constitute this case study. Participant observation, though 
limited, forms part of the data collection and analysis. 
 The original actors in the case are Indian and Dutch labour 
activists, a Dutch fashion brand, and its Indian supplier. The string of 
events was activated when the activists – the Clean Clothes Campaign 
and India Committee of the Netherlands (ICN), and two NGOs based in 
India, CIVIDEP and GATWU – targeted a Dutch fashion brand (G-Star) 
on account of the denial of labour rights in the factories of its Indian 
suppler (Fibers and Fabrics India). In its later stages, the conflict 
pulled in various national organizations like the courts in India, 
embassies, and various ministries in India and the Netherlands, as 
well as global institutions like the National Contact Point (NCP) of the 
Organization of Economic Development (OECD), the European 
Parliament, and a host of other global civil society actors. 
 I received a sequential and detailed description of the events 
from G- Star, FFI, and ICN; probably the legal nature of the case 
prompted actors to make meticulous timelines of the key events. 
These documents formed the skeleton of the description that follows. 
The sequential description was fleshed out with semi-formal 
conversations; I have spoken to 25 respondents  connected to the case 
of which eleven individuals allowed the conversations to be recorded. 
Trends in public opinion were observed through newspaper 
clippings, websites and blogs (most of which are still available on the 
websites of the activists), and other information collected from the 
local court and institutions in India. 
 One of the key problems that I faced at the start of the data 
collection was the political nature of the conflict and the difficult 
resolution that had left all sections tired, bruised, and unwilling to 
open up. The legal nature of the conflict also meant that most actors 
remained steadfast to the publicly stated/expected position. Further, 
as I was reaching out, a resolution had been reached which involved 
an explicit agreement that none of the parties would make statements 
outside official channels. For this reason, conversations were kept 
informal and served only to confirm publicly stated positions, and to 
iron out the discrepancies in the sequence of events, if any. Some 
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emotionally charged quotes that did escape were captured and used. 
 
Nationals and Cosmopolitans 
The Backdrop: Glory of ‘emerging India’ 
From the beginning of the 2000s, India joined China in being heralded 
by observers, politicians and industry leaders of all shades and 
persuasions as a rapidly emerging country. Although a poor country 
by any measurement, the rate at which the Indian economy was 
growing became an irresistible lure for global businesses convinced 
by the hopes of quicker returns impossible in mature economies. This 
is a pronounced transformation in the nature of the relationship 
between the two regions: in the early 1960s, for example, the 
shortfall in India’s milk production was filled by aid from the Dutch 
dairy industry. Nowadays, though the poverty and deprivation 
continues, Indian politicians and industry leaders revel in the 
attention they command from global leaders, including the Dutch. 
 The financial service sector represents a major share of the 
Dutch economy, and the IT infrastructure that forms the basis of that 
sector is largely supported by the largest of Indian IT companies like 
TATA, Infosys,  and Wipro, through their outsourcing operations. The 
Netherlands does not have a large manufacturing sector, and official 
policies focus on high-tech support in new fields such as 
biotechnology, aerospace, horticulture, and so on, where the Dutch 
believe they have an advantage. The nature of Indian manpower, it is 
argued, is better suited to cater to such industries which do not 
require mass manufacturing (in which China is considered to hold an 
unassailable position, owing to its substantially better developed 
infrastructure). Further, importance attached in advanced 
democracies like the Netherlands to the issues of freedom and 
democracy has resulted in India’s global image being cast in a much 
more favourable light, politically, than it is in China. As one of the 
businessmen in a delegation that I took part in said: ‘it is nice to be in 
India. I can get to read European newspapers on the Internet, and see 
CNN. Last month I was in China for two weeks. I had no idea what was 
happening back home. The newsreader’s lips in China do not sync 
because they purposely delay the voice to censor any unfavourable 
recording’. 
 Speeches in these delegations are strewn with phrases 
indicative of national pride – ‘emerging superpower’, ‘the 21st century 
belongs to India’, ‘highly skilled and trained manpower’ – as well as 
thinly veiled jibes at China  in comments about India’s ‘vibrant 
democracy’. It is also common to hear speakers extolling India’s “soft 
power” (yoga, spirituality, democracy, Bollywood) which the Indian 
state actively promotes through its embassies around the world. 
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Trade and business relationships between Dutch and Indian 
companies, manifested in outsourcing and supply chain relationships 
and a shared celebration of democracy, has thus become the primary 
form of engagement between the two countries. However, this high-
tech and self- indulgent revelry was cut short, if but temporarily, by 
an event that reminded everyone engaged in trade promotion 
between India and the Netherlands of the perennial problems of 
poverty and inequity in Indian society. 
 The case to follow was triggered in the year 2005 when the 
larger textile producers in Asia and major fashion brands of the world 
were excited by the lapse of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA). The MFA 
had, for decades, distributed import quotas among producing 
countries in order to create an  equitable access to lucrative markets 
in Europe and North America. China and India were some of the 
major quota-constrained countries (more production capacity than 
what was then being exported through the quota system) and were 
expected to benefit by a boost in exports (Bair, 2008; Abernathy, et al, 
2006). Though not as glamorous as the IT industry, the textile 
industry has huge significance for developing country governments 
such as India, as it not only brings in foreign exchange but also 
employs a large number of the poorest and least skilled people in the 
population. For a related reason, such industries also receive most 
attention when it comes to social responsibility, and universal codes and 
standards, as workers who are desperate for work are also 
susceptible to exploitation. Ever since the early 90s, when the early 
revelations of the conditions in Nike’s suppliers in Asia received global 
attention, the standard practice of activist organizations involved in 
improving labour conditions in producing nations has been to make 
explicit the relationship between end consumers, brands, and 
suppliers (see Spar and La Mure, 2003). 
 At another level, developed country governments are under 
constant pressure from trade unions and protectionist vote-banks as they 
respond to the increasing insecurity of its workers as jobs are moved to 
cheaper locations in Asia. Politicians of rich countries (particularly the 
United States) argue for the inclusion of labour standards as a quality 
criterion in global trade; in other words, for inclusion of the ‘social clause’ 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Chan, 2003). As one would 
expect, developing nations, in which production occurs, and in spite of the 
competition among them, often gang up at international fora, where they 
are constantly at loggerheads with developed countries, and often beat 
down the latter’s demand for better working conditions by making use of 
such generally disliked terms in free- market circles as the ‘non-tariff 
trade barrier’ (ibid.). 
 Observers have noted two other reasons for the firm stands that 
the Indian government assumes in global politics. Firstly, the history of 
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import substitution policy had ingrained in Indian politicians and local 
institutions a mind-set that develops and protects local companies from 
global competition, or promotes them as global players (Tewari, 2006). 
Secondly, the near total indoctrination of political parties of all shades 
and hues in India2, in favour of free trade and liberalization, and the 
firming up of linkages between politicians and business groups, are well 
documented. Since the 1970s, national governments and industrial elites 
have resisted demands for securing basic needs (of which the demand for 
labour rights is one), by maligning them as part of a Western strategy 
designed to maintain their traditional privileges gained unjustly through 
colonialism and inimical to economic growth in developing countries 
(Galtung, 2004, 1979). As noted also by Hensman (2000), ‘anti-




In mid-2005, workers of FFI had approached Indian activists with 
complaints  that they were being abused by the factory supervisor, 
with implicit support from his management. The complaints included 
reports of beatings and verbal abuse. Following protocol, the activists 
realized the importance of identifying the brand for which the 
products were being manufactured. They therefore asked the 
workers to tear off a label from one of the clothes in the  unit in 
which he was working. The moment it was discovered that the brand 
being supplied by the manufacturer was G-Star, a Dutch company, the 
issue spread like wildfire to the Netherlands. 
 In many respects, the Netherlands is unique in the sense 
that it has a high concentration of global activist groups and 
comparatively sophisticated political and public awareness of issues 
related to human rights violations. The fact that it also provides the 
location for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) probably 
contributes to the high sensitivity of the general public. The Dutch 
activist groups at the forefront of this case were the Clean Clothes 
Campaign (CCC), headquartered in the Netherlands, and the India 
Committee of the Netherlands (ICN), run by a smaller group of 
activists interested in conditions of children in hazardous labour 
conditions and the former untouchables (dalits) in India. Both Indian 
and Dutch activists formed part of global human rights networks and 
have shared similar international fora in the past. This helped create a 
common front when fashioning a strategy to tackle this new issue. 
 
2
 The political outfits on the left of the spectrum are probably exceptions, 
given their ideological opposition to economic globalization and the resulting 
casualization of workers. 
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 Over the following few months, the Dutch activists 
collaborated with the local activists in India, who had started 
conducting further interviews with the workers. Once they were 
convinced that they had collected sufficient information from India, 
they requested a meeting with G-Star headquarters in Amsterdam. G-
Star did not respond – at least, not soon enough for the activists. 
Around the same time, an article appeared in a Dutch newspaper 
Trouw, referring to the violations at one of G-Star’s suppliers. 
Immediately afterwards G-Star requested a meeting at its head- 
office. The spokesperson insisted to me that the appearance of the 
company’s name in the press had nothing to do with its change of stance 
towards the activists; those concerned were already preparing for the 
requested meeting and were not in any way pressurized by the media 
attention. The activists think that the latter may have contributed to their 
allegations being taken seriously. The Dutch media entered the debate in 
more significant ways, as we will see later, when some press articles and 
statements meant for local consumption became evidence against the 
activists in the legal battles to follow. 
 In any case, this first meeting between the Dutch activists and G-
Star took place in early December 2005. Both parties recall the general 
mistrust that pervaded the atmosphere. G-Star’s spokesperson insists that 
they approached the activists under the impression that ‘these were 
people who could help us’ and presented the company’s social policies to 
the visiting activists. (The buyer did not have an official CSR policy; CSR 
matters were handled by the legal department, and the key contact 
person was a lawyer by training). The activists, however, felt that the 
management did not have an open attitude; their appraisal of the 
company’s attitude was ‘who are you to teach us how to run our 
business?’ The article that had appeared in the press was also discussed: 
the activists were adamant that the allegations were true, and G-Star 
equally adamant that they were not. Activists further demanded that G-
Star should join the Fairwear Foundation, a ‘multi-stakeholder initiative’ 
(MSI) with which the activists were closely associated (MSIs were a fad 
during these years, with every industry feeling incomplete without one). 
G-Star was not uninterested, but did not want to be forced into anything 
(‘we told them not to push us’) because according to them, the 
accusations were false in the first place. 
 Although G-Star doubted the veracity of the allegations, it 
informed the owners of the factory (FFI) in India about them and 
requested that they be looked into. FFI is one of the largest companies in 
India, supplying to major retailers like Tommy Hilfiger, Ann Tailor, GAP 
and MEXX. Most of these brands have their own internal social audits of 
suppliers to ensure that there are no violations of internationally 
accepted standards. Considering the history of activist campaigns against 
large clothing/sports goods manufacturers over the past few decades, it 
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might be assumed that the factory was selected only after meeting all the 
expected standards. Nevertheless, G-Star also asked the supplier to begin 
the certification of its processes according to Social Accountability 8000 
(SA 8000), one of the most widely used social auditing mechanisms. The 
information that these steps were taken was conveyed by G-Star to the 
activists in the Netherlands. 
 However, these actions by G-Star and FFI did not satisfy the Dutch 
activists. Their main demand was that FFI should enter into a dialogue 
with the local activists who had first discovered the violations. Audits, 
they ridiculed in their publications, were just an insufficient ‘quick fix’. 
Allowing the local activists open access to the factory and involvement in 
decision making, they believed, was a more effective way to address the 
alleged labour violations and to prevent future violations. 
 Indian activists, too, had approached FFI asking for a meeting to 
address the issue, but were rebuffed. FFI’s position was that the 
allegations were false, and that they had internal measures to ensure that 
labour violations would not arise. More importantly, they found no need 
to engage because they were not trade unions in the conventional sense 
(i.e. with a membership that included its workers and officially 
registered). FFI and its supporters never failed to emphasize that under 
Indian law, the activists’ claim to be the voice of workers were 
illegitimate. As the factory spokesperson suggested, ‘if we had agreed to 
listen to these people, any passer-by in future can expect us to listen to his 
or her opinion on how to run the company.’ The statements released by 
the Dutch activists on their websites and to the press constantly referred 
to the Indian activists, rather loosely, as ‘trade unions’, a sloppiness that 
would work against their favour in the later stages of the dispute. 
 Both local and Dutch activists also missed an opportunity to 
partner with rooted organizations which might share the ideological 
visions of the activists. However, to be fair, they may not have made much 
headway. In spite of the substantial overlap between the stated aims of 
global activism and trade unions, even the Centre for Indian Trade Unions 
(CITU), the trade union representing the Communist Party of India 
(Marxists), seemed suspicious of the intentions of the global activists. The 
head of the Karnataka  chapter asked me about foreign NGOs in general: 
‘what stake do they have in the growth of Indian industry?’ 
 However, realizing their lack of institutional standing, around 
March 2006, the Indian activists quickly made a move and registered 
themselves as a trade union called GATWU. This change of status failed to 
impress the factory, since the person in charge of the newly formed union 
was closely associated with the activist leader of CIVIDEP, who in turn 
has had a long- standing reputation in Bangalore for highlighting workers’ 
interests (see Choudhury, 2005). The new trade union was seen merely as 
an extension of CIVIDEP and hence as continuing along the antagonistic 
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path followed by CIVIDEP.
3 Even if this historical association with 
CIVIDEP was not the case, FFI would still have felt no legal compulsion to 
recognize GATWU unless workers in its factory officially became 
members. 
 Rather, the conflict was only becoming more confrontational, as 
the factory owners recognized the role of the Indian activists in the 
ratcheting up  of international pressure by the Dutch activists on G-Star 
and its other important buyers. Throughout this early period, Indian 
activists were busy conducting further interviews with workers in the 
factory. The results were consolidated into an ‘independent fact-finding 
report’ and made available on the websites of the Dutch activists by 
spring 2006. The report claimed that the investigation exposed ‘serious 
physical abuse and psychological intimidation’. FFI refuted the 
independence of the study, since the NGOs conducting the interviews 
were paid by the activists at the centre of the allegation. The lack of the 
report’s independence, however, does not necessarily mean that the 
allegations were false. However, since the Dutch activists repeatedly drew 
on its independence as an indication of the veracity of their claims, this 
objection from the factory received a lot of support from powerful actors 
who were beginning to enter the arena. While the reports received much 
attention and credibility in the circles that the activists could influence, 
within the institutions that the factory was located, they were seen as just 
another effort by international organizations to tarnish the company’s 
and the country’s global image. 
 Intensity in the Netherlands was also building steadily and 
crossed the tipping point when Dutch activists called for a boycott of G-
Star products in Europe. G-Star was now struggling to divert the 
increasing attention and damage inflicted by the campaign on its image. 
Another meeting took place in  Amsterdam in June 2006, in which both 
the representative of FFI and the activists participated. In what seems like 
a step taken under pressure, FFI finally agreed to meet with the newly 
formed trade union to discuss working together in future. The parties also 
agreed that an independent person connected to the justice system 
should be asked to interview the workers in  the presence of local 
activists. To reassure workers that there would be no resulting 
repercussions, it was agreed that the meeting would take place outside 
the factory premises, and that the people involved would remain 
anonymous. 
 However, any hopes G-Star had for a solution were short-lived. 
While a meeting between the FFI and Indian activists took place in the 
first week of July 2006, when G-Star’s representative met up with the 
Dutch activists to discuss the breakthrough in India, they realized that the 
 
3
 For the rest of this case study, I will continue to refer to CIVIDEP/GATWU as 
‘Indian activists’. 
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minutes drafted by the two parties were not consistent.
4
 Nevertheless, G-
Star tried to convince the activists that it was taking all necessary 
measures, and requested that allegations from activist websites be 
removed and the boycott called off. The activists, however, were in no 
mood for conciliatory gestures unless the newly formed trade union were 
given sufficient legitimacy by the factory. They consequently went ahead 
with more of their publicity campaigns. From this point on, the focus on 
violence at FFI was supplemented by a denial of workers’ rights to form a 
trade union under the leadership of GATWU. Indeed, the recognition of a 
newly formed union by FFI would in future become the key demand of 
the activists; ascertaining whether the violations actually took place was 
no longer centre-stage. FFI continued to insist that it was not breaking 
any Indian law by maintaining the status quo. As we will see later, the 
tendency of Dutch activists to ignore the credence of the Indian legal 
system was to work against them in future. 
 As noted earlier, FFI was one of India’s largest textile exporters 
and consequently enjoyed considerable political clout and protection 
locally. Realizing by now that that it had limited control over the 
international dialogue, the factory began to flex its muscles. FFI started 
with institutions where its cause would receive a better reception – the 
political community, public bureaucracy, and the justice system. These 
national institutions rose to the factory’s defence with an appreciable 
readiness, and their combined onslaught was totally unexpected on the 
part of the activists. Like most global activists placed in cosmopolitan 
spheres, they were less prepared for, or able to garner sufficient support 
from, national institutions (even within a liberal polity like the 
Netherlands). 
 
Choreography of National Pride and Xenophobia 
The first rude awakening that things were beginning to go terribly against 
the script written by the Dutch activists came in July 2006 when FFI filed 
a lawsuit against the Indian activists, accusing them of defamation by 
supplying false information to global activists. According to G-Star, the 
decision to resort to legal means was an independent decision which it 
clearly did not support. Rather, G-Star was trying to defuse the situation 
since it had more to lose from any escalation. From its perspective, FFI’s 
legal move was unwelcome. However, G-Star’s spokesperson told me in a 
measured tone that ‘they have their independence to take any step that 
they think is good for their company’, and that they also had ‘the right to 
take any legal steps’ they wished. Meanwhile, FFI’s spokesperson told me 
that they had tried to find an amicable solution, but was repeatedly 
 
4 Given that I was not able to access either set of minutes, it is difficult to 
ascertain both what had transpired during the meetings, and what the 
inconsistencies were. 
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rebuffed by the intransigence of the activists. It was only after being, 
‘pushed to the wall’, that the company took the legal route. 
 Stupefied by and indignant at the factory’s legal move, the Dutch 
activists began to make the first of a series of tactical mistakes, mostly 
due to their underestimation of the importance placed by a national 
government on  its country’s global image. The decision of the supplier to 
file a legal complaint, and the subsequent court order, fit neatly into the 
narrative the activists were creating in Europe. This development was 
proof of their view that ‘trade unions’ in India were in a sorry plight. In 
subsequent press releases, they questioned the legitimacy of the court 
ruling; the restraining order was cleverly dubbed a ‘gagging’ order, and 
catchy slogans caught the attention of their target audience (“G-Star, don’t 
be a gag-star”), while a small group with their mouths covered with duck 
tapes protested outside the plush precincts of the company. Although 
they were addressing both a Dutch and a global audience, the activists did 
not realize that their actions were being closely followed in India and 
perceived as insults to the Indian legal and political system. These, in 
retrospect daft, moves by the activists gave enough fuel to align an 
additional number of crucial national actors in favour of the company. 
 Activists had sent their letters of protest to other international 
brands sourcing from FFI. These brands reacted by conducting their own 
audits (a few of them without notice to the factory) and came to the 
conclusion the buyer complied with international standards. Some of 
them, the factory claims, even placed further orders with the company. 
But by the end of 2006, these same brands – particularly Tommy Hilfiger 
and GAP – were becoming increasingly uneasy over the negative attention 
paid the firm by the international media. As a result, they started 
requesting that the factory drop its proceedings against the local activists, 
but FFI stuck to its guns and insisted that it was unethical for it to be 
prevented from seeking judicial remedy. The representative of GAP in 
India was so insistent that the factory made a complaint against her to the 
GAP headquarters. But the media attention was damaging for most 
buyers. From an illustrious array of buyers at the beginning of the year, 
the FFI was now left with only a single buyer, G- Star which, in spite of 
being the flashpoint, had chosen not to sever the relationship (‘cut and 
run’ in industry-speak). The spokesperson claimed G- star took this 
decision since they believed workers’ rights were best served by 
maintaining ties with the supplier, while seeking to gradually improve 
working conditions. 
 Articles criticizing G-Star and FFI had already started appearing 
on the websites of the activists, and also sporadically in Dutch 
newspapers. The role of the Dutch newspaper Trouw, though intended to 
support the cause of the activists, backfired badly on them. A reporter 
from Trouw on his way to Bangalore first visited the activists in the 
Netherlands, in order to discuss the problem that was unfolding over 
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there. But when the newspaper article was published, it took everyone – 
including the activists – by surprise. A photograph of women huddled 
together outside a building was printed with a subtitle suggesting that 
these women were protesting outside the supplier’s factory. In fact, the 
photograph was of a meeting of women on reproductive health issues, 
was nowhere near the supplier’s premises, and was taken in 2005. 
Furthermore, the article claimed that the supplier used child labour, 
although the activists publicly noted that the journalist had 
misunderstood their position, and that they had never claimed that child 
labour was a problem at FFI. They had given the journalist a separate 
report on child labour in the Indian mining industry, and apparently the 
reporter had conflated the two issues. Instantly aware of the blow to their 
credibility, the Dutch activists ensured that the newspaper printed a 
correction at a later date, but the damage had been done. This article was 
cited to me by three respondents – two of them in the Indian government 
– and presented in the court cases to follow as an example of the 
deviousness of the activists. The same article was also part of the 
evidence supplied to the court in India proving that the Indian activists 
were transgressing the injunction orders.
5
 
 From their beginning as a tussle played on cosmopolitan 
terms, matters transcended themselves, as they gradually descended 
from a cosmopolitan space to distinctly national boundaries. Faced 
with the need for  institutional support, the activists filed a complaint 
against G-Star and the National Contact Point (NCP) in October 2006. 
The NCP is entrusted with the  implementation and promotion of 
ethical behaviour by companies based in the OECD countries.6 As part 
of the OECD, the Netherlands has a well- organized NCP, functioning out 
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Under their firm belief that G-Star 
had unmitigated control over its factory, the letter sent by the 
activists claimed that the buyer had ‘violated the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises in its business relations with its suppliers’. 
It further reiterated activists’ support for ‘Indian organizations 
involved in the struggle for workers’ rights’. Although G-Star had some 
control over the factory, it appeared helpless in convincing its 
supplier in some cases. For example, FFI agreed to get the SAI 
certification and meet up with the activists; this was requested by G-
Star. But the company appeared unable to force FFI to retract its legal 
proceedings. NCP accepted the complaint. In accordance with the 
stipulations of the NCP regarding cases under consideration, the 
activists halted their publicity campaign and suspended the 
publication of related material. The irony was not lost among the 
 
5 As is the case in all defamation suits, the Indian activists could no longer provide 
information until the case was resolved. This included providing information by 
proxy to other (foreign) organizations. 
6 More information is available at www.oecd.org. 
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Indians who questioned why the activists were willing to obey the 
stipulations of the NCP by stopping their propaganda while the issue 
was being investigated, while at the same time challenging the 
somewhat similar procedure engaged in by the Indian legal system. 
 Meanwhile the arms of the Indian government, mainly the 
Ministry of Textiles and the Ministry of Commerce, started showing 
interest and stirring into action. The globally managed activism was 
tarnishing the assiduously built image of India as an ideal destination of 
FDI. FFI’s lobbying was probably beginning to work as well. In November 
2006, the central government requested that the provincial government 
investigate the matter. Under instructions from both national and 
provincial governments, the labour department – which has a statutory 
responsibility for ensuring that factories are run according to the law – 
conducted its own investigation into the matter. This inspection found the 
allegations of the activists to be baseless. According to the FFI 
spokesperson, the labour commissioner ‘congratulated us for the good 
job we are doing for our people’. 
 Some observers may well miss the significant power and 
independence that these provincial governments and bureaucracies wield 
within India. Karnataka, the province which has Bangalore as its capital 
(where FFI is located), has more than 60 million inhabitants and covers 
an area larger than 100, 000 square kilometres. In addition to the relative 
power of the provincial government on account of its size (Karnataka is 
the eighth largest province in India), it has a much larger profile because 
it is at the vortex of the IT boom in India. That FFI was able to mobilize 
this large bureaucracy, which notoriously moves only when politicians 
ask it to, and in the suggested direction, is a clear indication of the 
company’s political leverage and the importance governments place on 
protecting the interests of private capital. 
Ironically, at the end of the tumultuous 2006, FFI won the ‘Golden Trophy’ 
awarded by the Ministry of Commerce for the outstanding (i.e. biggest) 
exporter in the previous year (2004 - 2005). At the time of receiving the 
award, the director of the company spoke to the minister and informed 
him of the problem he was facing (‘in the five minutes they were on the 
stage together’). The Minister at that time was Kamal Nath, known 
internationally as a vociferous and combative protector of business 
interests of developing countries in institutions engaged in global policy 
making like the WTO. 
 As the future of the company became bleak, FFI now took an 
action unprecedented in previously documented disputes involving local 
companies and global labour movements. On 11 January 2007, the Dutch 
activists received an unexpected legal notice from lawyers representing 
the supplier, accusing them of disrespect of local institutions, including 
courts and statutory bodies. Notices were also served on internet service 
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providers in the Netherlands hosting their sites. The allegations against 
them included ‘cybercrime’, ‘acts of racist/xenophobic nature’, and 
‘criminal defamation’. Following the Indian interpretation of legal 
responsibility, FFI’s lawyers argued that, since the websites of the 
European activists were accessible to a person sitting in India, the 
defamation could be considered to be a crime committed on Indian soil. 
Furthermore, continued publication of allegations was seen as a violation 
of the earlier injunction on local activists against defaming the factory or 
passing on information to external observers. The judge in India accepted 
the arguments made by FFI’s lawyers, and the activists in Europe were 
asked to defend themselves in his court in Bangalore. 
 The Dutch activists were beginning to realize that things were 
more serious than they had previously imagined, as they were now 
personally entangled in a lawsuit. Never before had a company filed a 
lawsuit against a foreign NGO/activist, and, as a result, they had no 
precedent to help them fashion a response. They also seemed unable to 
break free from their habit to publicize every development. In their reply 
to the lawsuit (also uploaded on their websites!), they stressed that there 
could be a solution only if their demands for recognition (of local activists 
by FFI) were met. They called the legal notice a ‘threatening letter’, and 
followed this up by regular updates titled ‘Indian garment companies try 
to silence Clean Clothes Campaign’, and ‘Indian supplier of Euro/US 
Brands gags activists’. In addition to the lawsuit, around the same time 
the activists also received a strong letter from the Indian Embassy in the 
Netherlands accusing them of maligning the country’s image according to 
what it thought were baseless allegations. Indian institutions thus aligned 
themselves in protecting a factory in their country, which according to 
them represented their version of national pride conjured up almost 
entirely in economic terms. 
 Meanwhile the preparation for certifying the FFI’s units along SAI 
standards, initiated in November 2005 was progressing steadily. At the 
end of the process, each of its units was approved by the certifying bodies. 
By early 2007, all its units were granted SA 8000 certification which, for 
those who trust the value of audits in ensuring ethical production, proves 
the compliance of the company to internationally recognized labour 
standards. This shocked the Dutch activists. They reacted vigorously 
against the approval provided by SA 8000 certification to a factory which 
had initiated legal proceedings against labour activists. After a sustained 
publicity campaign against SAI for its role in certifying the units, the 
certification was withdrawn. SAI came up with a new clause that if a 
company takes legal action against NGOs, all certifications should be 
provisionally withdrawn. This came as a shock to both the certifiers who 
conducted the approval (who spent a lot of time certifying the company) 
and the management of FFI. The local certifier, Bureau Veritas, told me 
that ‘we were confused that the conditions for certification would change 
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so abruptly. We have asked the company to return the certificate we 
issued’. To the management of FFI, which had spent a huge (undisclosed) 
sum in preparing the company for audit, the inclusion of new laws came 
as a surprise. The new stipulation, it claimed, denied the company’s basic 
human right to resort to legal proceedings when it felt that justice had 
been denied. The fact SAI had withdrawn the certification earned by the 
company as a result of public pressure merely added to the supplier’s 
sense of injustice. Furthermore, a website update on the activists’ 
website, FFI claimed, contained confidential information that could have 
been procured only from the SAI. They filed another lawsuit – this time 
against the SAI. 
 In June 2007, the case against the Dutch activists came up for 
hearing in the Bangalore court. Having no choice, the activists appointed 
Indian lawyers to defend their case. The lawyers told the judge that the 
defendants could not appear in person as they were facing difficulties in 
obtaining the necessary visas. In fact, and understandably, the activists 
had no interest in being stuck in notoriously long legal proceedings in 
India. Needless to say, the Indian Embassy would have granted them visas 
almost instantly, had they put in an application. As one of the activists 
admitted to me: ‘we also did not know how long this would take, or if we 
might be prevented from returning to the Netherlands’. The judge would 
have none of it, and demanded their appearance in person. By September, 
and after providing multiple extensions, the judge considered issuing an 
arrest warrant (a standard procedure in the instance of non-appearance), 
but deferred judgment to November. 
 Although there was no let-up in the Dutch activists’ campaigns 
against FFI, they could no longer ignore the serious personal implications 
that had emerged. The legal action against Dutch citizens inadvertently, 
perhaps inevitably, paved the way for a new set of national actors to enter 
the scene – the political establishments of the Dutch state which until this 
point had remained aloof from proceedings. There seemed to be no risk 
that the Dutch government would extradite them to India, but there was 
an apprehension the arrest warrant might curtail their travel to other 
neighbouring countries under larger influence of the Indian government. 
For the first time, CCC and ICN began contacting the larger NGOs in the 
country – like Oxfam Novib, Amnesty International, and FNV Mondial (the 
global arm of the Dutch trade union). During my interviews, the 
representative of both Oxfam Novib and FNV Mondial chose not to discuss 
the veracity of the actual violations which had triggered the entire 
episode. The central concern of these new global actors was the alleged 
restrictions placed by FFI on forming unions, the legal proceedings 
against activists, and the resulting restrictions placed on their mobility 
across the world. They feared that this supplier’s actions could set a 
precedent for other factories in producing nations, and therefore believed 
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A Triumph of National Scale 
The issue finally entered the Dutch parliament in October 2007 when a 
member of the Socialist Party raised a question on the floor asking the 
Government’s opinion on corporate social responsibility of Dutch firms 
abroad. The minster of the time answered that since this was a debate 
between private parties, the government would not intervene. This 
hands-off stance by Dutch politicians would not remain viable for too 
long. They were about to be yanked into the eye of the storm, as the issue 
created diplomatic discomfort during two state visits in late 2007. The 
first visit, in October 2007, was led by the Queen of the Netherlands who 
had a long-standing interest in development and social issues in India. 
The activists, who were by now shaken, sent an open letter requesting the 
Queen’s delegation to find a solution to the plight of the workers, and of 
course their own legal battle. 
 But the FFI were not sitting idle either. Starting from the five 
minute exchange at the award ceremony with the minister of commerce, 
it now had the entire Indian establishment on its side. Its slick lobbying 
ensured that the issue had reached the top of the agenda and officials 
involved were crouching and ready to pounce. The visit of Dutch royalty 
offered an ideal opportunity. In preparation for the royal visit, senior 
bureaucrats collected all necessary details from FFI. The FFI’s 
spokesperson told me: ‘nowadays bureaucrats in India are accessible and 
communicative. I even got sms responses from senior bureaucrats in the 
central government on my mobile. E-mail response time is less than a day 
– even after office hours!’ Owning a multi-million dollar enterprise has its 
benefits after all. 
 In a widely announced visit of the Dutch Queen to India, the entire 
Dutch press witnessed and reported the one sore point in the generally 
friendly ties between the two countries. When a larger delegation led by 
the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs visited India immediately 
afterwards,8 the issue was once again raised. The Indian politicians, led by 
Kamal Nath, argued forcibly to the effect that Dutch activists were 
spreading lies, and that the Dutch Government’s subsidy to such an 
organization also constituted a non-tariff trade barrier and a violation of 
the WTO rules. Kamal Nath even threatened a trade boycott of the 
Netherlands. 
 Given the industrial and trade policy of the government 
introduced earlier, this response was hardly surprising (Tewari, 2006; 
 
7 A mediation initiated by Amnesty International failed to defuse the 
situation. 
8
 In November 2007; I was a delegate on the Dutch side. 
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Hensman, 2000). FFI’s current predicament was immediately recognized 
and categorized as just another instance of a ‘non-tariff trade barrier’ 
being imposed on developing countries by the developed countries 
worried about job losses and trade imbalances. The government 
therefore found adequate justification to get engaged in protecting FFI’s 
interest and, by extension, the interests of Indian industry as a whole, and 
by implication, ‘national interest’. 
 A significant section of the Indian media also followed up on the 
issue; in particular, the English-language press which usually shows 
interest in these delegations and caters largely to festering middle-class 
nationalism. Energized by the Minister’s jingoism, journalists confronted 
some Dutch members of the delegation and pushed them for an 
explanation. Cornered in such a situation, some senior Dutch figures 
expressed a negative opinion of the actions of the Dutch activists. These 
statements were instantly relayed back into the Dutch media, which had 
until that point only carried the views of the activists. The willingness of 
certain sections of the Dutch media to provide an alternate picture was a 
welcome break for FFI. According to the FFI spokesperson, ‘it was the first 
time we smiled during the whole episode’. 
 The confrontational stance of the Indian politicians, the 
impending arrest warrants for Dutch citizens, and the queering of 
diplomatic ties resulted in national institutions taking over from global 
actors. In the statement to the parliament on his return, the Dutch 
Minister of Economic Affairs (who led the recent delegation) reserved a 
substantial amount of time to discuss the behaviour of the activists. He 
unequivocally requested a more judicious approach by Dutch NGOs in 
their attempts to improve what they believe to oppressive institutions in 
other countries. The various arms of the Dutch government were also 
now getting fully engaged. A representative of the Dutch consulate in 
Mumbai was asked to attend the legal proceedings in Bangalore, along 
with a legal advisor. After a few sessions in the court, the lawyer noted 
with alarm that the trial was rapidly moving in a direction which would 
result in arrest warrants being issued against the activists and the 
directors of the internet service providers. 
 Finally, in December 2007, an arrest warrant was indeed issued 
by the Bangalore court, which ruled that the relevant ministry in Delhi 
was to be contacted and ordered to make a case for extradition of the 
accused to India. The issue was brought up for discussion during question 
time in the Dutch parliament where political parties from the left of the 
protectionist part of the spectrum wanted to know if the Government 
intended to extradite the Dutch citizens. The initiation of the legal 
proceedings had already cut short FFI’s client list and global standing as a 
preferred supplier. Throughout the period, however, G-Star had not 
severed ties with FFI arguing that the livelihoods of workers would be 
placed at risk. However, once these arrest warrants were issued, the local 
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pressure became unbearable and it, too, succumbed and publicly declared 
it would withdraw its contracts with FFI. 
 It was becoming clear that all parties needed a solution. A former 
Dutch Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, respected for his skill in finding 
solutions to intractable diplomatic hiatus in global politics, was roped in 
to broker a deal with the opposing groups. Lubbers in turn selected a set 
of people in India he had known during his long career as an international 
diplomat. These new persons were also acceptable to all the parties 
involved and so formed a grandly termed ‘Committee of Custodians’ to 
look into the matter and to reach an impartial conclusion. This committee 
emphasized right at the outset that the Indian laws and systems were 
sufficient to ensure the establishment of workers’ rights. However, to 
meet the activist’s concerns, a complaint redress mechanism was put in 
place, and an ombudsperson (a retired judge, who had presided for many 
years over the National Human Rights Commission) was appointed to 
receive complaints from workers (should any arise in future). The 
significance of national institutions was on public display for everyone 
involved. 
 The Dutch activists had to withdraw the complaint filed with the 
OECD, remove all accusatory material from their websites, and refrain 
from publicizing the matter any further. Simultaneously, the supplier was 
forced to drop all court cases against the activists, both local and Dutch. G-
Star was urged to re-establish commercial ties with the supplier, since the 
livelihoods of more than 5,500 workers were at stake. G-Star now has an 
official CSR department, headed by the same person who was initially 
delegated by the legal department to handle the case. She is openly 
grateful to the activists for having pushed the company into ‘making 
official’ the practices they had been following all along. In July 2008, the 
last remaining litigation against the local activists was withdrawn. 
 While there are no legal cases pending, the status now is of an 
uneasy peace. Speaking to the Dutch actors (ICN and G-Star) gave me the 
impression that nobody is entirely happy with the solution. Activists feel 
that their work is severely restricted by the arrangement: public 
campaigns targeting reputations of supplier and buyers – the preferred 
and potent strategy of activists – had been ruled out. G-Star is keeping its 
lips sealed and has not provided any opinion about the arrangement. The 
mood is, however, gloomy; the company’s spokesperson wondered how 
long the arrangement could go on. The simmering discontent boiled over 
once in 2009, a year after the episode, when one of Lubbers’s assistants in 
the negotiations published a description of the conflict which closely 
followed the narratives of those opposed to the activists (Lambooy, 
2009). The reactions of the actors to the publication provide further 
insights into the partly irreconcilable ideological preferences of the 
various actors involved (see Stoop, et al, 2010). In spite of these 
disagreements, there seems to be a preference to not seem overly critical 
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of the arrangement. The personal stature of Lubbers might offer part of 
the explanation for the semblance of peace. The losses sustained by both 
actors in the Netherlands may also be restraining them from disturbing 
the status quo. 
 
Discussion 
What are the morals of the story? The main revelation seems to be the 
glaring limitations of cosmopolitan institutions and the continuing, if not 
increased, significance of the repertoires of nationalism. Hidden morals 
and standards are ready to spring onto unsuspecting cosmopolitans who 
casually wander into a national space. The events that started from these 
cosmopolitan spheres (human rights, international trade, global 
standards) proceeded, as the struggle became serious, into two distinct 
national frameworks and it was there that resolutions were finally found. 
Some actors were adept at using the cosmopolitan spheres, others better 
at national, and a few skilled in recognizing the inter-linkage between 
these spheres. 
 The activists, who were clearly in the cosmopolitan space, seemed 
out of touch with the increasing nationalism and egos of Indian politicians 
and missed the plot once national institutions became involved. They 
assumed that global pressure can always make a difference to local 
conditions. When things became too hot to handle, they also engaged with 
the state, by writing to the Queen (as national as it gets) and by lobbying 
ministers and Dutch members of Parliament. But these actions came as an 
afterthought. 
 In contrast, FFI, though global in orientation, was in tune with the 
music familiar to local institutions partly inured  to exploitation and 
energized by nationalism, and mostly driven by economism. They also 
had the financial muscle that both Indian and Dutch activists lacked to 
help align national institutions in their favour. The evidence I have on 
actual violations having occurred at FFI is inconclusive. My description 
merely underlines the fact that collaborations between firms and national 
institutions to offer a choreographed defence of local firms against global 
activism are tendencies in the structure; actors with the wherewithal are 
able to activate them for the ends they hold dear. 
 To claim that the national sphere was shown to be fundamental to 
securing human rights for the weak does not mean that global activism 
was entirely ineffectual. For their part, the Indian activists at CIVIDEP and 
GATWU are relatively more satisfied. They had scored a significant 
victory and believe they are being taken seriously, if not by FFI, by other 
suppliers in the area. Sitting in their frugal office that probably serves also 
as their home, the activists were visibly elated to have made a dent in a 
social structure that tends to disregarded them. As one of the activists 
told me, ‘we brought them to their knees’. 
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 The mood at FFI, though, is far from upbeat. While activists’ 
appeal to cosmopolitan human rights arguments left them unaware of 
local realities, FFI, in contrast – embedded into its traditional modes of 
thinking – failed to recognize that the challenge posed by the activists was 
not legal in nature, and definitely not national. I was taken around the 
premises during my two visits. In the first, in mid-2008, the spokesperson 
was combative and proudly showed me a high-tech washing unit which 
was ‘one of the two productions units in the world…the other is in 
Indonesia…our buyers anywhere in the world can know the exact state 
their product is in.’ On my second visit in 2009, as I walked past the 
Mercedes parked in the driveway, the tone had mellowed and he was 
more reflective: ‘we built this company from scratch with a lot of hard 
work. Now type my company’s name in Google and all you read about is 
labour violations. We have been beaten black and blue’. On my way in, I 
had noticed an elderly security guard peeping out of a gap in the company 
gate onto the main road. On my way out after a 2hr meeting, I was 
surprised to find him in exactly the same position, staring with the same 
intensity. He was keeping a careful watch out for activists. It seems that 
financial muscles are insufficient for total defence. 
 As the battle fronts shifted towards recognition of the activists as 
a legitimate stakeholder by the firm, workers’ interests failed to remain 
top priority in the activists’ list of concerns. In significant ways, it was 
only after the involvement of national actors that attention was shifted 
back from abstract arguments – fostering participation – to the 
preservation of the jobs of real live workers who rely on FFI for their 
subsistence. Of course, the concerns expressed by politicians over the 
livelihoods of workers in risk (if FFI did shut down) may have been a 
crafty ploy to justify the defence erected by state actors. However, the risk 
was real, at least for a short while. Whether a similar outcome for 
workers can be guaranteed every time firms and states combine forces 
against global activism cannot be claimed with any certainty. We cannot 
know, either, if the same actors would have acted differently, if given a 
second chance; as Burawoy observes: ‘history is not a laboratory 
experiment that can be replicated again and again under the same 
conditions’ (1998: 11). 
 However, there is compelling evidence that in most cases when 
corporations and the state collude, the resulting damage to the lives of the 
weak in other developing countries tends to be extensive (Utting and 
Zammit, 2009; Newell, 2008; Barley, 2007; Randeria, 2003). Business and 
society scholars, who suggest that multinational actions must contribute 
to improving the regulation of multinationals in developing countries 
(Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Hsieh, 2009) and who believe in the silent 
complicity of multinationals in atrocities perpetrated by the state 
(Wettstein, 2012, 2010), implicitly acknowledge this domineering 
presence of the state. Recent post- colonial appraisals have therefore 
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correctly concluded that theories in business and society that ignore the 
state have finally ‘come up against the brick walls of sovereignty and 
democracy’ (Banerjee, 2010: 272). Contributing to improving national 
institutions is necessary and, quite rightly, multinationals could play a 
role here. 
 A related theme that has not been sufficiently incorporated into 
these aspirations is that top managements of multinational corporations, 
and corporate elites whom they partner in developing countries, often 
share interests which may be antithetical to the well-being of the poor 
(Bardy, et al, 2012; Pratt, 1991 are exceptions).9 Observers of the state 
from outside the business and society space have noted how imprecisely 
understanding that globalization has eroded state powers contributes to a 
thickening smoke- screen behind which devious corporate-political-
bureaucratic collaborations collude and plunder with impunity (cf. Petras, 
2008; Randeria, 2003). State- firm collaboration organizing in favour of 
private capital, and the resulting higher chances of damaging the lives and 
life-chances of the weak, strengthens arguments recently made for the 
inclusion of class-based politics in the analysis of global production 
(Selwyn, 2012; Glassman, 2011; Sassen, 2010; Bair, 2010). Without 
addressing this nexus between public and private interests, the road 
towards making a substantial contribution to nationally mandated 
regulation can be treacherous. 
 Calls, instead, for partnering social movements that are gaining 
the support of the poor in developing countries against unjust policies 
offers an appealing alternative (Banerjee, 2010; Hsieh, 2009). In as much 
as messy geopolitical conflicts have been ignored in the theoretical 
models to study the impact of globalization in much of business and 
society literature, so, too, has the potency of production processes to 
exacerbate structural inequities contributing to violence within nations 
(cf. Annavajhula and Pratap, 2012; Galtung, 1990). Collaborations with 
such movements can be more arduous than is recognized. 
Understandably, most movements perceive the private sector (national 
and foreign) as complicit in the miseries heaped upon them in the name 
of development; a sincere effort will be needed to overcome suspicions. 
Further, leaderships and ideologies which energize industrial actions 
often overlap with subversive movements, leading to violent 
confrontations that pit the public-private-police nexus against the 
oppressed – whom business scholars expect global activism to defend 
(Annavajhula and Pratap, 2012). In an article oozing prescience, Galtung 
(1990) observed that elites in developing countries prefer stability (‘a 
freezing apathetic society’) dancing to the ‘rhythm of structural violence’; 
when the repressed respond with violence, it is they (rather than the 
 
9
 See Mustapha and Islam’s (2013) profile of the owner of the Rana Plaza, the 
building in Bangladesh that collapsed in April 2013 leading to the tragic 
death of more than 1000 textile workers engaged in making branded clothes. 
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oppressors) who are categorized as violent.
10 Whether global civil society 
organizations and top managements, as  well as business and society 
scholars, will have the stomach to take sides in the brutal confrontations 
erupting with increasing frequency and intensity in developing countries 
remains to be seen (Ghosh, 2012). 
 Policies set by national governments concerning human rights, 
and the agencies which implement these services (labour departments, 
police, policy advisors, courts), are potent tools of injustice on which, at 
least in powerful states like India and China, global actors can wield at 
best a marginal influence. Global designs to circumvent state institutions 
or engage in open confrontation with them are easily scuttled by schemes 
that rely on a steady source of nationalist emotions combined with an 
uncritical acceptance of corporate interests as always being in the 
national interests (Mitra, 2012; Khan, Westwood and Boje, 2010). The 
nuanced view of global ideas filtering through national institutions, being 
modified in the process while modifying the institutions (cf. Djelic and 
Quack, 2003; Sassen, 2003; Brenner, 2000), requires serious attention by 
business and society scholars, who dream of a larger role for 
multinationals in contributing to the lives of individuals in developing 
countries. As Sassen (2003) advocates, rather than suggesting that global 
activism or cosmopolitan obligations work in a void, it is important to 
first recognize the state and consider how modernity itself has 
transformed the nation. For Sassen (2003: 28): 
 The question as to how citizens should handle these new 
 concentrations of power and ‘legitimacy’ that attach to global 
 firms and markets is a key to the future of democracy. My efforts 
 to detect the extent to which the global is embedded and filtered 
 through the national … is one way of understanding whether 
 there lies a possibility therein for citizens, still largely confined to 
 national institutions, to demand accountability of global  
 economic actors through national institutional channels, rather 
 than having to wait for a ‘global’ state’. 
 Multinationals, international business scholars, and global civil 
society groups, who believe themselves to be fighting for cosmopolitan 
rights in a “post-national” world, can benefit from direct attention to the 
emergence and transformation of structures within the nation state. The 
chances of success are higher if they support movements led from the 
inside by embedded individuals who are committed to social justice and 
with a proven capacity to garner institutional resources for securing it. 
Such individuals are simultaneously able to demand and expect a 
minimum degree of protection on account of their being citizens. On their 
 
10
 Cf. Annavajhula and Pratap (2012) and Teltumbde (2012) for recent events 
in India that vindicate these views, as well as the BBC News (2012) for a 
similar tragedy in South Africa, and Burke (2010) for police violence on young 
workers in Bangladesh. 
                                                                                        Poruthiyil / Crouching Standards, Hidden Morals 
 111 
own, cosmopolitan ideals may simply backfire on its proponents. 
 
PostScript: ‘China Envy’ 
One of the reviewers of this study wondered if its title, associated with 
a Chinese film, is appropriate for a case involving India and Holland. In 
this concluding section, I will briefly introduce what I call China envy – 
something that has plagued democratic countries in the global South, 
including and in particular India. 
 It is commonly noted by external observers that the authoritarian 
regime in China has had a fundamental role in the massive economic leap 
made by the country during the past few decades (Cai, 2008; Yang, 2006). 
Infrastructure, which is essential for refashioning a predominantly rural 
economy into a modern economic power, involves coordinating massive 
social changes – usually involving sacrifices by one group in order to 
benefit others: for instance, by displacing villagers and/or indigenous 
people on a large scale to suit the life-styles of urban dwellers (Penz, 
Drydyk, and Bose, 2011). In contrast to the protracted delays caused by 
concerns of social justice in democratic countries, the Chinese construct 
sea-ports, highways, and railroads with an efficiency that has left external 




 Quite often in India, this mode of decision making and 
implementation is looked upon with envy. Playing catch-up with China 
has, according to those who believe in economic growth at all costs, been 
impeded by the troubling feature of democracy, where ordinary persons 
have the opportunity to protest against injustice. The benefits of 
authoritarianism are being feted particularly when it contributes to 
successful completion of large infrastructural projects in the country 
(Economist, 2012; Das, 2012; Narayanan, 2012). Lest it be thought that 
only Indian politicians are pining for such authoritarianism, consider this 
statement by the U.S. Transportation Secretary reflecting on the recent 
advances made in China on modernizing its infrastructure: ‘the Chinese 
are more successful because in their country only three people make the 
decision. In our country, three thousand people do’ (quoted in Osnos, 
2012: 51). The title of this case, therefore, is meant to reflect China envy 
among political classes in democratic countries exasperated by 






 See He and Warren (2011) for a history and recent transformations in 
Chinese authoritarianism 
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